UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-21-2009

State v. Horton Appellant's Brief Dckt. 36435

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Horton Appellant's Brief Dckt. 36435" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2424.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2424

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO.
Plaintiff-Respondent,

1

NO. 36435

& \.. j r

v.
JOURDARRYL KARRIE HORTON,

1
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

1
Defendant-Appellant.

i
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA
HONORABLE DEBORAH A. BAIL
District Judge
MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
SARA B. THOMAS
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. # 5867

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ldaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

DIANE M. WALKER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. # 5920
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ldaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..............................................................................

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE............................................................................

I

Nature of the Case .....................................................................................
I
Statement of the Facts and
I
Course of Proceedings...............................................................................
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ....................................................................

6

ARGUMENT........................................................................................................ 7
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Horton's Motion To
Suppress Because The Stop Violated Mr. Horton's Constitutional
Rights As Officer Sunada Failed To Possess Any Reasonable,
Articulable Suspicion To Believe Mr. Horton Had Been Involved
In Any Criminal Activity And, Therefore, Evidence Seized Should
7
Have Been Suppressed ...................................................................................
A. Introduction ..............................................................................................7
B. The Standard Of Review To Evaluate A Motion To Suppress
On Appeal ..............................................................................................7
C. The Stop Of Mr. Horton Was Unconstitutional Because Officer
Sunada Lacked Any Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion To
Believe Mr. Horton Was Involved In Any Illegal Activity ............................. 8
D. The State's Alternative Argument For Attenuation Would Have
Also Failed Due to Arizona v.Gant ........................................................... 11
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................16
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ...............................................................................17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Arizona v. Gant. 129 S.Ct. 1710 (April 21. 2009) ..................................................
7
12
Chime1 v. California. 395 U.S. 752 (1 969)...........................................................
9
Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).............................................................
13
Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1 966) ............................................................
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) ..........................................................12
State v. Alexander. 138 Idaho 18, 56 P.3d 780 (Ct. App . 2002) ...........................
8
State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 79 P.3d 734 (Ct. App . 2003) ..........................
9
State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 117 P.3d 876 (Ct. App . 2005) .............................9
Sfafe v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655. 152 P.3d 16 (2007)......................................

15

State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159. 15 P.3d 1 167 (2000) .........................................7
State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 54 P.3d 464 (Ct. App . 2002).............................9
State v. Nunez, 138 Idaho 636. 67 P.3d 831 (2003).............................................8
State v. Roark. 140 Idaho 868, 103 P.3d 481 (Ct. App . 2004) ............................ 9
State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260. 47 P.3d 763 (Ct. App . 2001) ...............................9
State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509. 37 P.3d 6 (2001) .......................................9
Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) .......................

.
.
.............................................9

Thornton v. United Stafes, 541 U.S. 61 5 (2004) ...............................................

14

Wilson v. ldaho Transportation Department, 136 ldaho 270, 32 P.3d 164 (Ct.
App . 2001) .........................................................................................................
9
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471. 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963) .....................8. 15

Statutes
9 10
.................................................................
I.C. $49-428 ........................
.
.
.
I.C. § 49-456 .........................................................................................................
9
Constitutional Provisions

. art. 1, § 17 ........................
.
.
............................................................
8
ID. CONST
U.S. CONST
. amend. IV.................................... ... ................................................
8

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jourdarryl Karrie Horton appeals from the Judgment of Conviction and Order of
Probation. On appeal, Mr. Horton challenges the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress the evidence obtained following his arrest. Mr. Horton asserts the district
court erred denying the motion because Officer Sunada lacked reasonable, articulable
suspicion that Mr. Horton committed a traffic offense. Additionally, the State's attempt
to validate the illegal stop would have failed because arresting Mr. Horton on an
outstanding search warrant would not have authorized Officer Sunada to search the
vehicle under Arizona v. Ganf, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (April 21, 2009) (clarifying New York v.
Belfon, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) and holding that, "Police may search the passenger
compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if it is reasonable to
believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the
vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the arrest.")
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas
Mr. Horton's vehicle was properly licensed for a repossession agent. (Tr.Vol.2,
p.15, L.25 - p. 16, ~.3.)' His license plate's number was RPO 393. (Tr. Vo1.2, p.1 I ,
Ls.2-6.) All repossession plates issued by the Department of Transportation contain the

' There are two bound transcripts in the appellate record.

The transcript that has been
identified as Volume two by the Idaho Supreme Court contains the motion to suppress
hearing conducted on December 15, 2008, the change of plea hearing conducted on
February 9, 2009, and the sentencing hearing transcript conducted on April 6, 2009.
The preliminary hearing transcript filed with the Exhibits will not be referenced in this
brief.

alpha combination "RPO," although a person could theoretically obtain a personalized
plate with the alpha combination "RPO" due to an oversight by three supewisors.
(Tr.Vol.2, p.21, L.17-p.22, ~ . 1 8 . ) '
The Department of Transportation issues only one plate for a vehicle properly
registered for a repossession agent. (Tr. Vo1.2, p.25, Ls.5-8, p.15, Ls.20-24.) The law
prohibits a person from displaying the repossession agent license plate on the front of
the vehicle. (Tr. Vo1.2, p.17, Ls.12-25, p.20, Ls.19-25.) Had Mr. Horton displayed a
repossession agent license plate on the front of his vehicle he would have been
violating the law. (Tr.Vol.2, p.17, Ls.12-25.)
Officer Sunada did not know that the Department of Transportation had special
regulations for repossession license plates. (Tr.Vol.2, p.13, Ls.11-15.) He was also
unaware that the Department of Transportation attempted to make a special
designation, "RPO," to identify the vehicles that have been issued the special plate.
(Tr.Vol.2, p.13, Ls.14-17.) Officer Sunada did not realize that Mr. Horton's vehicle
properly displayed a repossession license plate.

(Tr.Vol.2, p.15, Ls.11-14.)

Until

stopping Mr. Horton's vehicle, Officer Sunada had never seen a repossession license
plate. (Tr.Vol.2, p.16, L.15.) Although he received training in repossession plates, he
had not been trained in what a repossession agent license plate looked like. (Tr.Vol.2,
p.17, Ls.5-11.)
The repossession plate program is designed solely for a financial institution to
recover motor vehicles that they have a security interest in under the law. (Tr.Vol.2,

' The "RPO" designation is not required by statue or administrative rules.
p.20, L.19-p.21, L.16.)

(Tr. Vo1.2,

p.19, Ls.10-13.) The banks contract with certain business or individuals to recover their
vehicles.

(Tr.Vol.2, p.19, Ls.14-16.)

A person working on behalf of the financial

institution receives the specialized plates. (Tr.Vol.2, p.19, Ls.20-25.) Tactical Recovery
is a repossession agent. (Tr.Vol.2, p.19, Ls.17-19.) The vehicle driven by Mr. Horton
was registered to Tactical Recovery. (Tr.Vol.2, p.1 I , Ls.2-6.)
Relatively inexperienced Meridian City Police Officer Leroy Sunada stopped
Mr. Horton's vehicle on June 7, 2008. (Tr.Vol.2, p.7, L.24

- p.8, L.4.)

Officer Sunada

executed the stop for the sole reason that Mr. Horton's vehicle did not possess a front
license plate. (Tr.Vol.2, p.8, Ls.20-22, p.1I , Ls.20-23.) Prior to Officer Sunada stopping
Mr. Horton, he ran a registration check on the vehicle. (Tr.Vol.2, p.10, Ls.8-10.) The
information received by Officer Sunada was unusual because it contained over ten
screens of information, whereas a normal return of information contains approximately
four screens.

(Tr.Vol.2, p.10, Ls.17-24.) After stopping and obtaining the driver's

identity, Officer Sunada ran Mr. Horton's name through dispatch for warrants. (Tr.Vol.2,
p.12, Ls.3-8.) Officer Sunada's standard practice is to run every person that he stops
for warrants. (Tr.Vol.2, p.14, L.23 - p.15, L.2.)
Officer Sunada discovered that an extraditable warrant from Canyon County
existed to arrest Mr. Horton.

(Tr.Vol.2, p.12, Ls.6-8.)

After arresting Mr. Horton

pursuant to the warrant, Officer Sunada searched Mr. Horton's vehicle. (Tr.Vol.2, p.12,
Ls.9-15.) During the search of the vehicle, Officer Sunada discovered the evidence at
issue in this case. (Tr.Vol.2, p.12, Ls.16-19.)
The State charged Mr. Horton by Information with the crimes of possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to deliver and possession of drug

paraphernalia. (R., pp.22-23.)

Mr. Horton filed a motion to suppress all evidence

obtained by the State because the traffic stop had been initiated in violation of both his
federal and state constitutional rights.

(R., pp.29-31.)

Mr. Horton provided a

memorandum further explaining his argument. (R., pp.35-39.)
In response, the State argued that the evidence should not be suppressed
because the stop did not violate Mr. Horton's constitutional rights against illegal search
and seizure. (R., pp.40-46.) The State argued that Mr. Horton had been stopped for
driving a motor vehicle without a front license plate although the law required that the
repossession plate only be placed on the back of the vehicle and that no front plate be
present. (R., pp.40-46.) However, because Idaho law does not have any written rules
or laws on what a repossession plate would look like, the officer was authorized to stop
Mr. Horton's vehicle. (R., pp.40-46.) The State thereafter provided a supplemental
memorandum to support the denial of Mr. Horton's motion. (R., pp.48-52.) The State
argued that even if the traffic stop were deemed illegal, the district court should still
deny the motion because of the attenuation doctrine. (R., pp.48-52.) The State argued
that Officer Sunada's discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant for Mr. Horton would
have validated the arrest. (R., pp.48-52.) Therefore, the search incident to the arrest
would have allowed Officer Sunda to search Mr. Horton's vehicle. (R., pp.48-52.)
The district court denied Mr. Horton's motion suppress. The district court found
that the stop was not illegal. (Tr. Vo1.2, p.38, L.21-p.40, L.17.) Therefore, all further
actions by the officer were appropriate. (Tr. Voi.2, p.40, Ls.8-17.) Thus, the search
incident to Mr. Horton's arrest did not violate either his federal or state constitutional
rights. (Tr. Vo1.2, p.40, Ls.16-17.)

Mr. Horton accepted a plea bargain from the state, preserving his right to appeal
the denial of his motion to suppress. (Tr. Vo1.2, p.42, Ls.6-8.) Mr. Horton agreed to
plead guilty to the possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver charge
and, in exchange, all other charges and a separately joined case would be di~missed,~
the prosecutor would recommend a unified five year sentence, with two years
suspended, and recommend probation. (Tr. Vo1.2, p.41, L.18 - p.42, L.25.) The district
court followed the agreement and imposed a unified five year sentence, with two years
fixed, and suspended execution of the sentence, placing Mr. Horton on probation for
five years. (Tr. Vo1.2, p.77, Ls.10-16; R., pp.73-78.) Mr. Horton filed a timely notice of
appeal from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.79-81.)

The joined case was the possession of methamphetamine charge reflected in Count II
of the criminal complaint. (R., pp.58-60.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Horton's motion to suppress because the
stop violated Mr. Horton's constitutional rights as Officer Sunada failed to possess any
reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe Mr. Horton had been involved in any
criminal activity and, therefore, evidence seized should have been suppressed?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Horton's Motion To Suppress Because The
Stop Violated Mr. Horton's Constitutional Ri~hts
As Officer Sunada Failed To Possess
Anv Reasonable, Articuiable Sus~icionTo Believe Mr. Horton Had Been Involved In
Anv Criminal Activitv And. Therefore, Evidence Seized Should Have Been Suppressed
A.

Introduction
Mr. Horton contends that the stop of his car was unreasonable and violated both

his Fourth Amendment right under the federal Constitution and his Article 1, § 17 right
under the Idaho Constitution to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Mr. Horton submits that the State failed to meet its burden to excuse the necessity for a
search warrant. The district court erred concluding that the State proved that Officer
Sunada possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Horton committed a traffic
offense.

Moreover, the State's second assertion to validate the search due to

attenuation fails in light of Arizona v. Ganf, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (April 21, 2009). Because
the State failed to meet its burden to excuse the necessity of a search warrant, the
district court erred denying Mr. Horton's motion to suppress.
B.

The Standard Of Review To Evaluate A Motion To Suppress On A p ~ e a l
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." State v. Holland,

135 Idaho 159, 161, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169 (2000). When a decision on a motion to
suppress is challenged, the appellate court should "accept the trial court's findings of
fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely review the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found." Id.

C.

The Stop Of Mr. Horton Was Unconstitutional Because Officer Sunada Lacked
Anv Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion To Believe Mr. Horton Was Involved In
Anv llleaal Activitv
The district court erred in denying Mr. Horton's motion to suppress. The State

failed to prove that Officer Sunada possessed reasonable and articulable suspicion that
Mr. Horton had been involved in any illegal activity.

The district court erred in

concluding that Officer Sunada's failure to recognize that Mr. Horton's license plate was
a proper issued repossession plate. Officer Sundada could not possess any reasonable
belief that Mr. Horton was not properly licensed because he did not know what a
repossession plate looked like. Moreover, the state failed to provide the information that
was given to Officer Sunada in the twelve screens of information, which more likely than
not contains information that Mr. Horton's plate was properly licensed. Therefore, the
district court erred in failing to suppress the evidence seized from the illegal stop.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. CONST.amend. IV. The ldaho Constitution contains a
virtually identical provision and it too protects its citizens from unreasonable searches
and seizures. ID. CONST.art. I,3 17; State v. Alexander, 138 ldaho 18, 22, 56 P.3d 780,
784 (Ct. App. 2002). Searches and seizures without a valid warrant are presumed
unreasonable and violate both Constitutional provisions. State v. Nunez, 138 ldaho
636, 640, 67 P.3d 831, 835 (2003). If evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized
exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal
search must be excluded as the "fruit of the poisonous tree."

Wong Sun v. United

States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The purpose of these constitutional rights is to "impose a
standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by governmental agents

and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and security against arbitrary invasions."
State

V.

Maddox, 137 ldaho 821, 824, 54 P.3d 464, 467 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)).
A vehicle stop constitutes a seizure of its occupants and is therefore subject to
constitutional limits. State v. Cerino, 141 ldaho 736, 737, 117 P.3d 876, 877 (Ct. App.
2005); State v. Roark, 140 ldaho 868, 870, 103 P.3d 481, 483 (Ct. App. 2004). An
officer may conduct an investigatory stop without violating a individual's constitutional
rights if under the totality of the circumstances the officer has reasonable suspicion to
believe that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime.

State v.

Bromgard, 139 ldaho 375, 379, 79 P.3d 734, 738 (Ct. App. 2003). When challenged,
the State bears the burden to prove a valid investigatory stop. State

v. Salato,

137

ldaho 260, 264, 47 P.3d 763, 767 (Ct. App. 2001). The State must demonstrate that at
the time of the stop the officer possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
person is engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal activity. Terry

v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1, 22 (1968). "The officer's suspicion must be more than a mere hunch[.]" State v.
Schumacher, 136 ldaho 509, 515, 37 P.3d 6, I 1 (2001). "'Based upon that whole
picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity."'

Wilson v. ldaho

Tmnsportation Department, 136 ldaho 270, 274, 32 P.3d 164, 168 (Ct. App. 2001)
(quoting United States v. Cortez, 499 U.S. 411,417-418 (1981)).
It is unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle without the properly
attached and displayed license plates. I.C. 3 49-456. Generally, a person must display
a license plate on their vehicle in the front and in the rear. LC. 3 49-428. However, the

law specifically provides for an exception for a license plate assigned to a repossession
agent. I.C.

3 49-428.

In the case of a repossession agent, the law requires that the

license plate only be attached to the rear of the vehicle. I.C. Fj 49-428.
In this case, Officer Sunada testified that the lack of a front license plate was the
sole reason he executed the stop. (Tr.Vol.2, p.8, Ls.20-22, p.11, Ls.20-23.) However,
Officer Sunada had no knowledge how the Department of Transportation distinguished
between regularly issued license plates and those designated for a repossession agent.
(Tr.Vol.2, p.13, Ls.11-17.) The State did not submit a copy of the multiple screen return
that Officer Sunada received prior to him stopping the vehicle. (Tr.Vol.2, p.10, Ls.1724.) It is unknown whether the multipage information identified the plate as belonging to
a repossession agent. (See generally Tr.Vol.2.)
Mr. Horton's vehicle, like all other repossession agent's vehicles, properly
displays their plates on only the back of their vehicle. (Tr.Vol.2, p.15, L.25 - p. 16, L.3.)
Mr. Horton's license plate number was RPO 393.

(Tr. Vo1.2, p.11, Ls.2-6.)

All

repossession plates issued by the Department of Transportation contain the alpha
combination "RPO" and, although a person could theoretically obtain a personalized
plate with the alpha combination "RPO," that would be simply due to oversight by three
supervisors. (Tr.Vol.2,p.21, L.17-p.22, L.18.)
Officer Sunada did not know that the Department of Transportation had special
regulations for repossession license plates. (Tr.Vol.2, p.13, Ls.11-15.) He was also
unaware that the Department of Transportation attempted to make a special
designation, "RPO," to identify the vehicles that have been issued the special plate.
(Tr.Vol.2, p.13, Ls.14-17.)

Officer Sunada did not realize that Mr. Horton's vehicle

properly displayed a repossession license plate.

(Tr.Vol.2, p.15, Ls.11-14.)

Until

stopping Mr. Horton's vehicle, Officer Sunada had never seen a repossession license
plate. (Tr.Vol.2, p.16, L.15.) Although he received training in repossession plates, he
had not been trained in what a repossession agent license plate looked like. (Tr.Vol.2,
p.17, Ls.5-11.)
Officer Sunada executed the stop for the sole reason that Mr. Horton's vehicle
did not possess a front license plate. (Tr.Vol.2, p.8, Ls.20-22, p.11, Ls.20-23.) Prior to
Officer Sunada stopping Mr. Horton, he ran a registration check on the vehicle.
(Tr.Vol.2, p.10, Ls.8-10.) The information received by Officer Sunada was unusual
because it contained over ten screens of information, whereas a normal return of
information contains approximately four screens. (Tr.Vol.2, p.10, Ls.17-24.)
The State possessed the burden of proof and they failed to demonstrate that
Officer Sunada did not receive information informing him that the plate belonged to a
repossession agent. Not only did the State fail to meet their burden of proof that Officer
Sunada did not know this was a repossession agent's plate, it also failed to prove that it
was reasonable for the officer not to know what a repossession agent's plate looked like
before he stopped Mr. Horton because he did not display a front plate.

D.

The State's Alternative Arqument For Attenuation Would I-lave Also Failed Due to
Arizona v. Gant
The State argued in the alternative that the motion to suppress should be denied

due to attenuating circumstances when Officer Sunada discovered a warrant for
Mr. Horton's arrest. The district court did not rule on the attenuation doctrine; however,

that theory would have failed because the warrant would not have allowed for the
discovery of the evidence in Mr. Horton's vehicle.
After stopping and obtaining the driver's identity, Officer Sunada ran Mr. Horton's
name through dispatch for warrants. (Tr.Vol.2, p.12, Ls.3-8.) Officer Sunada's standard
practice is to run every person that he stops for warrants. (Tr.Vol.2, p.14, L.23 - p.15,
L.2.)

Officer Sunada discovered that an extraditable warrant from Canyon County

existed to arrest Mr. Horton.

(Tr.Vol.2, p.12, Ls.6-8.)

After arresting Mr. Horton

pursuant to the warrant, Officer Sunada searched Mr. Horton's vehicle. (Tr.Vol.2, p.12,
Ls.9-15.) During the search of the vehicle, Officer Sunada discovered the evidence at
issue in this case. (Tr.Vol.2, p.12, Ls.16-19.) The State argued that Officer Sunada's
discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant would have allowed Officer Sunada to search
Mr. Horton's vehicle as a valid search incident to arrest. (R., pp.48-52.)
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the United States Supreme Court
first recognized that when a lawful custodial arrest occurs, it is reasonable for officers to
search the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control, for two reasons:
1) to remove any weapons that might be used to harm the officer(s) or effectuate the
arrestee's escape; and, 2) to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence.
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-763. Following Chimel, the Court then had an opportunity to
address the search incident to arrest rule and its application to the arrest of individuals
driving motor vehicles. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
In Belton, a single New York State trooper pulled over a speeding automobile.
Id. at 455. The vehicle was occupied by four individuals including Mr. Belton. Id. The

trooper discovered that none of the men owned the vehicle and none were related to

the owner. Id. The trooper smelled burnt marijuana and saw on the floor of the vehicle
an envelope marked "Supergold," which the trooper associated with marijuana. Id. 453
U.S. at 455-456. The officer placed all four men under arrest, patted them each down,
and placed them in four separate areas of the road so that they would not be in physical
touching proximity to each other. Id. 453 U.S. at 456. He picked up the envelope,
found that it contained marijuana, and gave each defendant the warnings required by
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Id. The trooper then searched each

defendant and searched the passenger compartment of the automobile. Id. On the
back seat, the trooper found a black leather jacket belonging to Belton, unzipped one of
the pockets, and discovered cocaine. Id. The trooper drove the arrestees to a nearby
station. Id. In reaching its decision, the Belfon Court applied the "search incident to
arrest" exception to the warrant requirement, previously articulated in Chimel.
The Court attempted to define Chimers "area within the immediate control of the
arrestee" language, in the context of the arrest of a recent occupant of an automobile,
by creating a "bright line rule" wherein the Court found that "articles inside the relatively
narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally,
even if not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab
a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]."' Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at
763). The Belton Court ultimately held that, "when a policeman has made a lawful
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." Id. at
460.

Recently, in Gant, the United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to
reassess the Belton rule.

In Gant, the defendant was arrested for driving on a

suspended license. Id. 129 S.Ct. at 1715. Gant was handcuffed and locked in a police
cruiser while officers searched his vehicle, locating a gun and a bag of cocaine in the
pocket of a jacket in the backseat.

Id. Citing to Justice O'Conner's Opinion in

Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 620, 631 (2004), the Gant Court found it
troubling that "'lower court decisions seem to now treat the ability to search a vehicle
incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an
exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel."' Id. at 1718 (quoting Thornton, 541
U.S. at 624 (Justice O'Conner concurring in part)). The Gant Court rejected such a
broad reading of Belton and held that "the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a
vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search." Id. at
1719 (emphasis added). Next, the Court concluded that there may be circumstances
unique to the vehicle context where an officer may search a vehicle incident to arrest
"when it is 'reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found
in the vehicle."' Id (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632). However, the Court observed
that "[iln many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there
will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence," unlike in
both Belton and Thornton. Id.
In the instant case, in attempting to justify the warrantless search of Mr. Horton's
vehicle, the State argued that the broad reading of Belton specifically criticized by the
Gant Court and permitted the search of the vehicle incident to arrest. Moreover, neither

of the exceptions articulated by the Gant Court, are applicable here. First of all, the
State failed to offer any evidence, nor is there any evidence in the record, that
Mr. Horton, or any of the occupants of the vehicle were an immediate threat to Officer
Sunada. (See generally Tr.Vol.2.); See also State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 152 P.3d
16 (2007) (recognizing that defendant who was "polite and cooperative" did not pose a
threat to officers).
Moreover, unlike in both Belton and Thornton, where the officers arrested the
occupants for possession of an illegal substance and, therefore, had reason to believe
they would discover additional narcotics in the vehicle, Mr. Horton was arrested for an
outstanding warrant. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 455-456, Thornton, 541 U.S. at 61. Here,
there was no reason to believe that evidence of any crime would have been discovered
in the vehicle.
Discovery of all evidence in Mr. Horton's vehicle should be suppressed because
there was no basis to search the vehicle. Therefore, Officer Sunada's unconstitutional
search should result in suppression of the evidence as "fruit of the poisonous tree." See
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (7 963).

CONCLUSION
Mr. Horton respectfully requests that this Court reverse the denial of his motion to
suppress, vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand the matter for further
proceedings.
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